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Survival, Look-Ahead Bias and the
Persistence in Hedge Fund Performance
Abstract
In this paper we analyze the persistence in the performance of hedge
funds taking into account look-ahead bias (multi-period sampling bias). To
do so, we model liquidation of hedge funds and analyze how it depends upon
historical performance. Next, we use a weighting procedure that eliminates
look-ahead bias in measures for performance persistence. In contrast to ear-
lier results for mutual funds, the impact of look-ahead bias is exacerbated
for hedge funds due to their greater level of total risk. At the four quarter
horizon, look-ahead bias can be as large as 3.8%, depending upon the decile
of the distribution. At the quarterly level, we nd positive persistence in
hedge fund returns, also after correcting for investment style. The empirical
pattern at the annual level is also consistent with positive persistence, but
its statistical signicance is weak.
Jel-codes: G11, G12, G23
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1 Introduction
During the last decade, hedge funds have gained tremendous popularity, par-
ticularly in the USA. Hedge funds are similar to mutual funds in that they
provide actively managed portfolios in publicly traded assets. Unlike mu-
tual funds however, they have a broad exibility in the type of securities
they hold and the type of positions they take. They can invest in inter-
national and domestic equities and debt, and the entire array of derivative
securities. They may take undiversied positions, sell short and lever up
the portfolio (see, e.g., Fung and Hsieh, 1997, Liang, 2000). According to
Brown and Goetzmann (2001), hedge funds are best dened by their freedom
from regulatory controls stipulated by the Investment Company Act of 1940.
Especially these non-standard features make hedge funds an interesting in-
vestment alternative with potential diversication benets for the existing
portfolio.
The question whether mutual funds and hedge funds show persistence in
their performance receives much attention in the literature (see, e.g. Gru-
ber, 1996, Carhart, 1997, Agarwal and Naik, 2000, Boyson, 2003, Bollen
and Busse, 2004). The underlying idea behind these studies is that investors
usually invest more in funds that recently performed well in the expectation
that these funds will continue to do so in the future. In the mutual fund
literature it is commonly found that the well performing funds attract much
larger money-ows than badly performing funds (see, e.g. Sirri and Tufano,
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1998). A recent paper of Agarwal, Daniel and Naik (2003) reports similar
ndings for the hedge fund industry. Apparently, it is also the case in the
hedge fund industry that money-ows chase recent performance. Although
the evidence is somewhat ambiguous, the majority of empirical studies con-
cerning mutual funds show that active selection, on average, underperforms
passive investment strategies. As argued by Berk and Green (2004), the ab-
sence of persistence in mutual fund returns might be due to the fact that
persistence in returns is competed away by mutual fund investors rationally
shifting their capital in search of superior investments. For hedge funds,
however, there are substantial hurdles to the quick and cheap movements
of capital. Hedge fund investors are often confronted with lockup periods,
that may be as long as one year, during which the invested money cannot be
withdrawn. Moreover, many funds apply a redemption notice period of up
to 90 days. Therefore, one might expect to see more persistence for hedge
funds than for mutual funds.
A major problem in evaluating hedge fund performance and its persis-
tence is the relatively high attrition rate. For example, Brown, Goetzmann
and Ibbotson (1999) report an attrition rate of about 14% per year over
1987-1996. If fund survival (directly or indirectly) depends upon historical
performance, it is well known that standard methods of analysis may lead to
biased results (see, e.g. Brown et al., 1992, Carpenter and Lynch, 1999, or ter
Horst, Nijman and Verbeek, 2001). Spurious persistence patterns may arise,
the form of which depends upon the survival process and the underlying het-
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erogeneity in fund characteristics. While most studies attempt to eliminate
survivorship bias by taking fund returns into account until the moment of
disappearance, a second ex-post conditioning bias, the so-called look-ahead
bias, is usually not accounted for. This bias arises because the employed
methodology implicitly or explicitly conditions upon survival over a number
of consecutive periods. When analyzing performance persistence, for exam-
ple, the fact that funds dissolve in a nonrandom way during the ranking or
evaluation period may cause a bias (see e.g. Brown et al., 1992, or Carhart,
1997). As stressed by ter Horst, Nijman and Verbeek (2001), the elimination
of look-ahead bias requires that the methodology be adjusted. An essential
step in the correction procedure (see Brown, Goetzmann and Ross, 1995)
is to model the survival process of hedge funds and how it relates to their
(historical) performance.
As noted by Fung and Hsieh (1997, 2000) and Liang (2000), practical
problems may complicate this issue. Because the hedge fund industry is
highly unregulated, and data sets may be subject to backlling biases, a
careful analysis is required. A wide range of empirical problems need to
be taken into account in order to prevent biased results (see, e.g. Fung and
Hsieh, 1997, Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft, 1999, Agarwal and Naik
2000). One of these potential biases is a self-selection bias that arises due to
the fact that hedge funds voluntarily report to a data vendor. Since hedge
funds are not allowed to advertise publicly, these data vendors serve as an
important distribution channel. Thus, self-selection bias exists either because
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underperfomers do not wish to make their performance known, because funds
that performed well have less incentive to report to data vendors to attract
potential investors, or because funds do not wish intervention in case SEC
interprets reporting as illegal advertising. Therefore, in contrast to mutual
funds, where fund attrition is usually related to bad performance, hedge funds
disappear from a database because of various reasons. Examples are that the
fund is liquidated, that it is closed to new investments, or that the manager
voluntarily decides to stop reporting. Out of these reasons, liquidation is the
relevant event related to the issue of survival. In our analysis, we focus on the
case where death is due to liquidation, as opposed to the case where the fund
continues to exist but stops reporting to the database vendor. Empirically,
about two thirds of hedge fund attrition can be attributed to liquidation.
In this paper we study liquidation, look-ahead bias and the persistence in
the performance of hedge funds that report returns in US$ over the period
1994-2000. The contributions of this paper are threefold. First and most
importantly, we nd that, compared to the mutual fund literature, look-
ahead bias for hedge funds is quite severe, especially at one-year horizons
and for funds with high attrition rates. Ignoring look-ahead bias, average
returns may be overestimated by as much as 3:8% per year. In contrast, ter
Horst, Nijman and Verbeek (2001), studying persistence in performance of
growthand incomemutual funds, report only slightly di¤erent estimates
after correcting for look-ahead bias. These ndings show that the impact of
look-ahead bias in persistence estimates is much larger for hedge funds than
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it is for mutual funds. Apparently, it is the case that due to the greater total
risk of hedge funds over their mutual fund counterparts, look-ahead bias is
exacerbated. This is consistent with Brown, Goetzmann and Ross (1995)
who document the precise relationship between total volatility and return
in a survival conditioned sample. Second, we extend the previous literature
on hedge fund attrition, by modelling the liquidation process allowing for
a exible impact of historical returns, by incorporating fund size as well as
aggregate time e¤ects to capture economy-wide shocks that a¤ect liquidation
rates of all hedge funds, and by testing for potential sources of misspecica-
tion. Our model for hedge fund liquidation provides an alternative for the
model of Brown, Goetzmann, and Park (2001), who explain survival from
style-adjusted returns, the age of the fund, a measure for relative perfor-
mance (i.e. the alpha), absolute performance, style adjusted return risk and
a time trend. Finally, we investigate persistence in hedge fund performance
with and without correcting for look-ahead bias using the methodology of ter
Horst, Nijman and Verbeek (2001). We conclude that correcting for look-
ahead bias increases the di¤erence in average returns of the top and bottom
deciles at the annual horizon. Nevertheless, we only nd a statistically sig-
nicant positive persistence pattern at the one-quarter horizon, no matter
whether the corrected or uncorrected method is used. This corresponds to
the ndings of Agarwal and Naik (2000).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
describe the sample of hedge funds that we employ and describe the potential
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biases that could arise. In Section 3 we model the liquidation process of hedge
funds. Section 4 examines persistence in performance for a sample of hedge
funds over the period 1994 - 2000, taking into account the potential biases
that might be present, and we briey discuss the robustness of our results.
Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Hedge funds data
Hedge funds seek to deliver high absolute returns and typically have fea-
tures such as hurdle rates and incentive fees with high watermark provision.
Investors in hedge funds are often confronted with lockup periods and re-
demption notice periods. Such restrictions on withdrawals imply smaller
cash uctuations, and give fund managers more freedom in setting up long-
term or illiquid positions. However, investors that follow an active selection
strategy of investing in funds that recently performed well might be nega-
tively a¤ected by this lockup period.
As mentioned above, U.S. based (onshore) hedge funds are free from reg-
ulatory controls stipulated by the Investment Company Act of 1940. Since
1996 the number of U.S. investors allowed in unregulated funds is 500. More-
over, domestic hedge funds can accept money from qualied investors, who
have at least $5 million to invest and have sophisticated understandingof
nancial markets. In addition they can accept money from pension funds
that have at least $25 million in capital. A distinction is made between on-
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shore and o¤shore funds, where the latter type of funds is typically developed
to raise capital from non-US investors. O¤shore hedge funds are non-U.S.
corporations, typically registered in a tax-haven and as such they are not
regulated by the SEC. While the number of net worth investors is unlimited,
participation from U.S. investors is still restricted.
These distinctive features, particularly the low level of regulation and the
long lockup periods, give hedge funds large exibility in the types of positions
they can take, by using short selling, leverage and derivatives. It allows them
to have a dynamic position by holding diverse asset categories and moving
quickly across them. Besides lack of regulation, strong managerial incentives
constitute a second important feature characterizing this industry. Such
incentives are largely based on performance. On average, fund managers
receive around 20% of annual prots, as well as an annual management fee
of about 1%: There is no incentive fee until the fund has recovered past
losses (i.e. returns have to surpass a threshold or high water-mark). This
incentive structure could lead to excessive risk taking, although this is often
dampened by a substantial managerial investment in the fund and the fact
that managers may incur in liabilities as general partners.
In this paper we use hedge fund data from TASS Management Limited.
In principle, the TASS database goes back to 1979, although the initial years
typically contain very few funds. By the beginning of the 1990s, about 200
funds were in the database. The fact that by 1998 more than 1400 active
funds are available illustrates the increased importance of the hedge fund in-
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dustry. Information on defunct funds is available only for funds that attrited
in 1994 or later. For the empirical results we shall therefore concentrate on
the period 1994-2000. Because our interest lies in persistence at horizons of
at least one quarter, we aggregate all information to quarterly levels. This
has the advantage of reducing the impact of return smoothing due to the
possibility that a hedge fund invests in securities that are not actively traded
(see Getmansky, Lo and Makarov, 2004).
During the sample period 612 hedge funds disappear from the sample.
Using additional information provided in the TASS database, we classify
these cases into liquidationand self-selection. This latter category refers
to cases where the fund continues to exist but stops reporting to TASS.
When it is mentioned that the fund stopped reporting because of one of
the following reasons closed to new investors, at fund manager request, or
fund matured, we consider it as self-selection. This is the case for 219 hedge
funds. For 316 funds TASS reports that the fund is liquidated. However, for
77 hedge funds the reason is unknown. In order to make an assessment of
the death reason for the funds where the disappearance reason is unknown,
we estimate quarterly money ows according to the procedure mentioned in
Agarwal, Daniel and Naik (2003). We aggregate these money ows over the
four quarters preceding the disappearance. If this nal year money ow is
negative, we classify the fund as liquidated, while otherwise it is considered
as self-selected. In this way, 49 of the remaining cases were classied as being
liquidated, while 28 funds were considered as self-selected.
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Below we shall focus on hedge funds reporting returns in US$. This
results in a total of 1797 funds, of which 1185 are active in the rst quarter
of 2000. This corresponds with an average annual attrition rate of 8:6% from
1994 to 20001, very close to the rate of 8:3% that was reported for 1994-1998
by Liang (2000) (using a similar data set). However, recall that attrition is
caused by both self-selection and fund liquidation, while liquidation is the
relevant event related to the issue of survival. Table 1 provides detailed
information on the numbers of funds that enter, are liquidated or are self-
selected in our data set in each quarter. For example, in the rst quarter of
1997, 69 funds enter the sample, while 20 funds are liquidated and 10 funds
are self-selected. Given that 1069 funds were present at the beginning of the
quarter, this corresponds to an attrition rate of 2:81% and a liquidation rate
of 1:87%.
In Table 2 we provide average quarterly returns for di¤erent subsets of
funds, as well as the returns on the S&P 500 index. The column labelled all
fundsrefers to all funds that were present in a given quarter, the column
labelled active refers to funds that are still active in the rst quarter of
2000, and the column labelled non-liquidatedrefers to all funds that were
present in a certain quarter and have not been liquidated (but may have
stopped reporting) during the sample period. Finally, the column labelled
liquidated refers to funds that had left the database by the end of the
1The average annual attrition rate is computed as four times the (unweighted) average
quarterly attrition rate.
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Quarter Funds existing liquidated self- attrition liquidation
entering selected rate rate
1994-I 50 577 0 0 0.00 0.00
1994-II 38 627 0 0 0.00 0.00
1994-III 60 665 0 2 0.30 0.00
1994-IV 55 723 4 1 0.69 0.55
1995-I 64 773 3 0 0.39 0.39
1995-II 47 834 3 11 1.68 0.36
1995-III 52 867 10 4 1.61 1.15
1995-IV 53 905 9 1 1.10 0.99
1996-I 67 948 15 3 1.90 1.58
1996-II 51 997 17 6 2.31 1.71
1996-III 63 1025 17 17 3.32 1.66
1996-IV 44 1054 21 8 2.75 1.99
1997-I 69 1069 20 10 2.81 1.87
1997-II 56 1108 16 10 2.35 1.44
1997-III 65 1138 15 13 2.46 1.32
1997-IV 46 1175 11 6 1.45 0.94
1998-I 68 1204 12 15 2.24 1.00
1998-II 41 1245 20 11 2.49 1.61
1998-III 57 1255 24 34 4.62 1.91
1998-IV 32 1254 19 19 3.03 1.52
1999-I 49 1248 15 12 2.16 1.20
1999-II 26 1270 17 23 3.15 1.34
1999-III 34 1256 25 20 3.58 1.99
1999-IV 13 1245 39 13 4.18 3.13
2000-I 20 1206 33 8 3.40 2.74
overall 365 247 2.16 1.30
Table 1: Quarterly numbers of US hedge funds in the TASS database that
enter, liquidate or self-select (stop reporting) during the sample period 1994-
2000
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Quarter all active non- S&P
funds funds liquidated liquidated 500
1994-I -0.018 -0.015 -0.016 -0.024 -0.035
1994-II 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.018 0.008
1994-III 0.017 0.026 0.024 -0.004 0.042
1994-IV -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 -0.013 0.002
1995-I 0.034 0.040 0.038 0.020 0.100
1995-II 0.041 0.054 0.050 0.010 0.097
1995-III 0.039 0.049 0.047 0.014 0.069
1995-IV 0.041 0.042 0.039 0.050 0.065
1996-I 0.031 0.036 0.036 0.014 0.067
1996-II 0.060 0.063 0.067 0.033 0.040
1996-III 0.019 0.024 0.022 0.007 0.025
1996-IV 0.057 0.066 0.063 0.032 0.081
1997-I 0.045 0.046 0.046 0.042 0.030
1997-II 0.051 0.054 0.055 0.033 0.178
1997-III 0.075 0.080 0.077 0.065 0.077
1997-IV -0.010 -0.004 -0.007 -0.024 0.020
1998-I 0.048 0.058 0.055 0.010 0.146
1998-II -0.012 -0.006 -0.011 -0.020 0.040
1998-III -0.049 -0.049 -0.048 -0.059 -0.138
1998-IV 0.051 0.061 0.057 0.000 0.251
1999-I 0.031 0.039 0.037 -0.022 0.056
1999-II 0.078 0.086 0.084 0.015 0.071
1999-III 0.005 0.007 0.006 -0.007 -0.068
1999-IV 0.129 0.136 0.135 0.002 0.138
2000-I 0.060 0.063 0.063 -0.065 0.038
overall 0.033 0.038 0.037 0.005 0.056
Table 2: Average quarterly returns of US hedge funds 1994-2000. The column
labelled all fundsrefers to all funds that were present in a certain quarter,
the column labelled activerefers to funds that are still active in the rst
quarter of 2000, the column labelled non-liquidatedrefers to all funds that
were present in a certain quarter and have not been liquidated during the
sample period, the column labelled liquidatedrefers to funds that had left
the database by the end of the sample period due to liquidation.
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sample period due to liquidation. Clearly, the table indicates that average
returns of liquidated funds are substantially below those of non-liquidated
funds. For example, the average return in the rst quarter of 1995 for non-
liquidated funds is 4:0%, while the average return is only 2:0% for funds that
have been liquidated by 2000. Combining both subsets produces an average
quarterly return in the rst quarter of 1995 of 3:4%: A striking result is that
the di¤erence in mean over the entire sample period between non-liquidated
and liquidated funds is about 3:2% per quarter with a t-value of 2.89. Over
the entire sample period, average returns of active funds are about 2:11%
(per annum) above the average returns of all funds, a number which Malkiel
(1995), Liang (2000) and others refer to as the survivorship bias. Note
that the average returns of non-liquidated funds (the combination of the
subset of active funds with the funds that have been self-selected during the
sample period) are about 1:52% (per annum) above the average of all funds, a
number one could refer to as liquidation bias. Both estimates are between
the 1:5% of Fung and Hsieh (2000) and the numbers presented by Brown,
Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999) [3%] and Liang (2000) [2:24%]. There is no
clear indication of a self-selection biasin average returns.
While it is commonly accepted that funds with a relatively bad perfor-
mance are more likely to be dissolved, it is not clear a priori over which
period historical returns are important to explain liquidation. To obtain
some insight into this question, Figure 1 presents conditional liquidation rates
(hazard rates) by performance decile over the next eight quarters. That is,
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in each quarter funds are ranked on the basis of (gross, raw) returns and
divided into 10 deciles. Next, for each decile, the average liquidation rate
is determined for one up to eight quarters after the ranking period.2 It is
clear from the gure that in the rst four quarters conditional liquidation
rates for loser funds (decile 1) are much higher than for winner funds (decile
10), while for the last two or three quarters the relationship is almost at.
This seems to indicate that quarterly returns are important determinants
of subsequent liquidation rates over the next four or so quarters, while at 8
quarters conditional liquidation rates are basically the same, independent of
initial returns.
There are a number of classication methods for hedge fundsinvestment
styles commonly used by data vendors, although none appears to be univer-
sally accepted. The TASS database employs two di¤erent classications. The
classication we use initially contains 17 styles which are mutually exclusive
and closely correspond to the commonly used Tremont hedge fund style in-
dices. It takes into account di¤erent dimensions simultaneously: asset class,
geographical focus and investment bias (i.e. US equity hedge funds; Euro-
pean equity hedge funds; Asian equity hedge funds; pure leveraged currency;
xed income directional; convertible fund (long only); etc.). However, this
investment style is not available for 269 funds (of which 242 are dead funds).
2The conditional attrition rate (hazard rate) corresponds to the probability of attrition
in quarter t + S conditional upon not being dissolved in the preceding quarters t + 1 to
t+ S   1; and conditional upon its performance rank in quarter t:
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Post-formation rate of liquidated funds
Ranking criterion : past one-quarter excess returns
In each quarter from Q2/1994 to Q1/2000, funds are ranked into decile portfolios
based on their previous one-quarter net excess returns. For the quarter
subsequent to initial ranking and for each of the next 8 quarters after formation,
the rate of liquidated funds as a percentage of the total number of funds still
existing at the beginning of each period is determined. Thus, the bar in cell (i,j)
represents the conditional probability of being liquidated in the post-formation
period i  given an initial ranking of decile j .
Figure 1: Conditional liquidation rates, 1 to 8 quarters after initial rank
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This represents a major drawback since we intend to study survival-related
biases by investment style. In order to determine the style of this subsample
of funds, we apply multiple discriminant analysis.
For all funds in the TASS database, we observe indications of their in-
vestment style through a set of 15 overlapping style indicators (e.g. bottom
up, market neutral, fundamental, ...). On average, each fund is character-
ized by at least four of these styles. The subsample of funds for which we
also observe a unique style classication according to the 17 styles distin-
guished above, is used to determine a set of discriminant functions. These
discriminant functions provide a set of scores for each of the 17 styles.3 Sub-
sequently, the discriminant functions are used to determine the scores for the
subsample of funds for which the appropriate style classication is missing,
after which each fund is allocated to its most likely style. While such a
procedure necessarily is subject to classication error, its within sample per-
formance is rather well, with 52.3 % of the funds classied correctly in one
of 17 investment styles.
As mentioned above, these 17 styles closely correspond to the Tremont
hedge fund benchmarks. Tremont o¤ers a series of nine hedge fund indices,
computed on a monthly basis and constructed out of hedge funds that have
at least $10 million under management and provide audited nancial state-
ments (see, e.g. Lhabitant, 2001). In Table 3 we report the number of
3In fact, one of these 17 style categories (pure property) contained only one fund and
was not used in the discriminant analysis.
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onshore o¤shore
Investment non dead total non dead total
Style liquidated liquidated
Convertible Arb. 5 0 5 4 2 6
Dedicated Short Bias 6 0 6 6 0 6
Emerging Markets 23 9 32 139 43 182
Equity Market Neutral 46 15 61 76 23 99
Event Driven 65 5 70 78 8 86
Fixed Income Arb. 7 1 8 14 6 20
Global Macro 3 1 4 21 6 27
Long/Short Equity 158 19 177 154 33 187
Managed Futures 100 41 141 123 92 215
Hedge Fund Index 118 15 133 263 69 332
All styles 531 106 637 878 282 1160
Table 3: Numbers of liquidated (referred to as dead) and non-liquidated
US hedge funds, by investment style
non-liquidated and liquidated funds assigned to a Tremont index. The in-
vestment style Hedge Fund Indexis a general hedge fund index and does
not refer to a particular investment style. We assigned funds without a clear
investment style, like fund-of-funds, to this category. In addition, we distin-
guish between o¤shore and onshore funds.
It appears that Long/Short equity and Managed Futures are the
most popular investment styles, with 364 and 356 funds, respectively. Fur-
thermore, the majority of the funds can be classied as o¤shore. A large
proportion of about 37:4% of the funds with investment style Managed
Futureshave been liquidated by 2000. For Emerging Markets, this per-
centage is about 24:3%; while for Dedicated Short Biasthis percentage is
0%. Clearly, this indicates that investment style might be a signicant factor
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in explaining fund survival. We do not observe striking di¤erences between
liquidation rates of o¤shore and onshore funds, although the rst group has
a somewhat larger proportion of dissolved funds.
In the next section, we present a model that explains liquidation of hedge
funds as a function of historical returns as well as a number of fund charac-
teristics, including investment style.
3 Modelling the liquidation process
Variables that are likely to a¤ect liquidation rates of hedge funds are histor-
ical returns over a number of previous quarters, fund size, age of the fund,
fund risk, an underwater indicator reecting negative returns over a prede-
termined period, and the funds investment style. To describe our liquidation
model, let yit be an indicator variable that indicates whether or not fund i
has liquidated in quarter t: Our specication describes the probability of fund
liquidation (yit = 0) using a longitudinal probit model, such that a fund does





0xi;t 1 + t + it (1)
yit = 0 if fund i is liquidated in quarter t (yit  0)
yit = 1 otherwise
19
where ri;t j is the return of fund i in quarter t  j, xi;t 1 is a vector of fund-
specic characteristics, including a set of style dummies, and t denote xed
time e¤ects describing economy wide e¤ects. The coe¢ cients ij indicate how
non-liquidation (survival) is a¤ected by the funds returns, lagged j quarters.
Compared to Liang (2000), who includes the average monthly return over
the funds history, this allows us to analyze the dynamic impact of historical
returns upon fund survival. For the moment, we x the maximum lag J
at 6. The ij coe¢ cients are assumed to be equal across funds, with the
exception of those cases in which less than J historical returns are available.
In such a case, the ij coe¢ cients are set to zero if the corresponding return
is unobserved (which is typically the case for funds with a recent inception
date). To reduce the e¤ect of a potential backll bias on our estimates,
information on a fund is only taken into account in the estimation of (1) at
the moment its age exceeds 4 quarters.
In Table 4 we present some summary statistics of the fund-specic vari-
ables (xi;t 1) that were included in the liquidation model (1). These descrip-
tive statistics are based on 19245 fund/period observations, while 10 of the
fund-specic variables are dummies. It appears that 59% of the observa-
tions are from o¤shore hedge funds. These funds, while reporting in US$,
are located in tax-havens like the Virgin Islands. The average incentive fee
of the fund manager is about 16%, but can be as high as 50% of realized
performance. Note that these incentive fees are only obtained when the fund
has recovered past losses (high water-mark). The annual management fee
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Variable mean std.dev min max
o¤shore 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00
Incentive Fees 15.93 7.90 0.00 50.00
Mng. Fees 1.62 1.06 0.00 8.00
ln(NAV) 16.72 1.77 7.58 23.30
ln(Age) 3.80 0.66 2.57 5.62
ln(Age)2 14.94 5.09 6.58 31.55
StDev 0.08 0.08 0.00 2.19
Underwater 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00
Emerging Markets 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Equity Market Neutral 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
Event Driven 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Fixed Income Arb. 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00
Global Macro 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00
Long/Short Equity 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00
Man. Futures 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00
Fund of Funds 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
Table 4: Summary statistics fund-specic variables.
varies from 0% to 8% (of net asset value) and has an average of 1:6%. The
age of the funds varies between 13 months and 275 months (about 23 years),
while the average age is about 45 months. The average size of the hedge
funds, measured by their log net asset value is 16.72, corresponding to about
18.3 million US$. Total risk is measured by the standard deviation of the
previous six quarterly returns (StDev). The underwater indicator is equal to
one if a fund has a negative cumulative return over the past eight quarters4,
which occurs in 17% of the cases. About 20% of the observations belong to
so-called funds-of-funds, while only 1% corresponds to hedge funds with a
4The cumulative return is determined over at least ve quarters with a maximum of
eight quarters.
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Parameters Estimate Std.error Parameters Estimate Std. Error
intercept 2.171 0.857 StDev 1.676 0.404
r1 0.913 0.229 ln(Age) -1.001 0.438
r2 0.820 0.246 ln(Age)2 0.142 0.058
r3 1.153 0.251 Underwater -0.387 0.070
r4 0.290 0.252 Emerging Markets -0.137 0.089
r5 0.101 0.234 Equity Market Neutral -0.219 0.101
r6 -0.384 0.203 Event Driven 0.165 0.131
o¤shore -0.136 0.057 Fixed Income Arb. -0.194 0.223
Incentive Fees -0.007 0.004 Global Macro -0.145 0.206
Mng. Fees -0.021 0.026 Long/Short Equity -0.083 0.088
ln(NAV) 0.171 0.017 Man. Futures -0.076 0.078
Loglikelihood: -1358.2194 Chi-squared test: 548.25 (DF = 42)
pseudoR2: 0.1679 (p = 0:0000)
Table 5: Estimation results liquidation model, including net asset value
(size). Coe¢ cient estimates for the time dummies are not reported.
xed income arbitrageinvestment style.
We estimate (1) using all investment styles, while including style dum-
mies to capture the possibility, as suggested by the summary statistics in
Table 3, that di¤erent investment styles are associated with di¤erent overall
liquidation rates. Given the limited number of funds with investment styles
convertible arbitrageor dedicated short bias, no dummies are included
for these styles and the funds are allocated to the general hedge fund in-
dex (reference category). In addition, the model includes time dummies to
capture aggregate shocks to the liquidation rates. Because fund size (NAV)
is not available for each period for all funds in our sample, we use the most
recent observation of net asset value available from the TASS database. How-
ever, there remain some observations for which NAV is missing and cannot
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Parameters Estimate Std.error Parameters Estimate Std. Error
intercept 4.189 0.797 StDev 0.735 0.377
r1 1.052 0.218 ln(Age) -0.599 0.414
r2 1.044 0.236 ln(Age)2 0.098 0.055
r3 1.374 0.243 Underwater -0.453 0.068
r4 0.447 0.235 Emerging Markets 0.031 0.086
r5 0.307 0.225 Equity Market Neutral -0.184 0.096
r6 -0.065 0.194 Event Driven 0.245 0.126
o¤shore -0.104 0.055 Fixed Income Arb. -0.066 0.219
Incentive Fees -0.008 0.003 Global Macro 0.089 0.208
Mng. Fees -0.031 0.025 Long/Short Equity -0.054 0.084
Man. Futures -0.284 0.073
Loglikelihood: -1452.3809 Chi-squared test: 455.82 (DF = 41)
pseudoR2: 0.1356 (p = 0:0000)
Table 6: Estimation results liquidation model, excluding net asset value
(size). Coe¢ cient estimates for the time dummies are not reported.
be imputed. This occurs in 7% of the cases. Because we do not want to elim-
inate these observations from our persistence analysis in Section 4, we also
estimated a second liquidation model from which ln(NAV) is excluded. This
model, based on a smaller information set, is used to correct for look-ahead
bias whenever information on net asset value is missing. The estimation re-
sults, based on either 19245 or 20413 fund/period observations, are presented
in Table 5 and Table 6, respectively5.
The results show that the impact of historical returns upon fund survival
is positive and signicant: funds with high returns are much less likely to
liquidate than funds with low returns. The impact of the individual quar-
ters decreases with each lag. Consistent with Brown, Goetzmann and Park
5The estimates for the time dummies are available upon request.
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(2001), the underwater indicator has a highly signicant and negative impact
upon survival, indicating that a negative aggregated return over the previous
two years increases the probability that a fund will liquidate. A comparison
with the results for mutual funds in ter Horst, Nijman and Verbeek (2001)
suggests that hedge fund survival is more strongly related to historical per-
formance, both economically, as measured by the coe¢ cient magnitudes, and
statistically, as reected by the corresponding t-ratios. As indicated by the
Chi-squared test, the variables in the models are jointly highly signicant,
while many of the variables are also individually signicant. For example,
fund size has a strong negative impact upon liquidation: smaller funds are,
ceteris paribus, much more likely to be liquidated than large funds. Surpris-
ingly, the magnitude of the incentive fee for a manager a¤ects the probability
of survival in a negative and signicant way, i.e. the higher the incentive fee,
ceteris paribus, the more likely it is that the fund will liquidate in the next
quarter. Age has a signicant nonlinear e¤ect: young hedge funds have a high
probability to disappear, but when funds become more mature, the liquida-
tion probability decreases. Most investment style dummies have a signicant
impact on survival probabilities. The funds with style event drivenhave,
ceteris paribus, the highest probability to survive, while funds classied as
equity market neutralhave the lowest survival probability. Interestingly,
no signicant e¤ect is found for the managed futuresstyle when fund size
is included in the specication, while it is highly signicant and negative
when size is dropped.
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The results of Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2001), who estimate several
alternative models for hedge fund failure, indicate a positive and statisti-
cally signicant impact of style adjusted return risk upon fund failure. This
is consistent with the idea that high risk funds are more likely to experi-
ence extreme returns and therefore more likely to be terminated (compare
Brown et al, 1992). However, in the current specications explaining fund
liquidation, standard deviation is statistically insignicant when fund size is
excluded (Table 6), and becomes signicant and positive when fund size is
added (Table 5). This suggests that, with a given return history and fund
size, high risk funds experience a somewhat lower liquidation probability.6
This is not inconsistent with the nding that high-risk funds are more likely
to liquidate, but it does indicate that high-risk funds are allowed to have more
extreme negative returns than low-risk funds before they decide to liquidate.
The specication reported in Table 5 is tested against a number of more
general alternatives. For example, we test whether the model is signicantly
improved when returns lagged 7, 8 and 9 quarters are added. The value of the
likelihood ratio test statistic is 4.82, which is insignicant at the 10% level.7
Furthermore we tested the logarithmic specication in size against a more
general alternative. The likelihood ratio test on the inclusion of ln(NAV )2
produces an insignicant value of 0.09. In summary, the results of these tests
6The results in Tables 5 and 6 are not driven by outliers. Moreover, the results are
similar if alternative measures for standard deviation are used (e.g. based on monthly
returns).
7The asymptotic distribution is Chi-squared with 3 degrees of freedom.
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do not indicate serious shortcomings of the current specication.
In order to obtain an indication of the probability that an arbitrary hedge
fund will liquidate in the next quarter given its past record of returns and
its age, we use the estimates of (1) to compute the probability of liquidation.
In Figure 2 the liquidation probabilities are reported for funds with di¤erent
ages, with a minimum of 5 quarters, where historical returns vary from  10%
to +10% for each of the last six quarters. The underwater indicator is set
equal to one if the cumulative return over the previous six quarters is nega-
tive. All other variables are xed at their sample average. It appears that for
a fund with an age of 12 quarters and a return record of  10% for each of
the last six quarters, the probability to liquidate in the next quarter is about
4:6%, while for a fund with the same age but a return record of +10% for
each of the last six quarters the liquidation probability is only 0:5%. Note
that the underwater indicator has a strong impact on the probability of liq-
uidation. If a fund is underwater, implying that the manager will not receive
the incentive fee, the probability that a fund will disappear increases from
almost 1% to about 2:5% for a fund at an age of 12 quarters and a past aver-
age return around 0%: It is clear that fund age a¤ects liquidation nonlinearly.
Apparently, liquidation rates of funds that recently started are less a¤ected
by a poor historical performance than those of funds that are around for
several years, while older funds are also less likely to liquidate. These results
are consistent with Boyson (2003), who investigates the relationship between


























 previous six quarters
Figure 2: Liquidation probabilities by fund age and previous six quarters
returns (as implied by the estimated liquidation model).
young managers are much more likely than old to be terminated for poor
performance.
4 Estimating Persistence in Performance
The question whether hedge funds show persistence in their performance
has received much attention in the recent literature. For example, Brown,
Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999) use annual returns of o¤shore hedge funds
and do not nd persistence in their sample. Agarwal and Naik (2000) use
quarterly, half-yearly and annual (post-fee and pre-fee) returns and examine
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short-term as well as long-term persistence. They nd that persistence is
highest at the quarterly horizon and decreases when moving to a yearly
horizon. However, persistence in quarterly returns could be a¤ected by the
fact that most hedge funds only report on an annual basis. The investment
style of the hedge funds is not relevant for the persistence pattern found by
Agarwal and Naik (2000).
In this section, we will rst examine whether there is performance per-
sistence in raw returns. Basically, we examine whether winningfunds are
more likely to be winners in the next period. To obtain some indications
about the probabilities that hedge funds from the top deciles remain in the
top deciles, Figure 3 reports a contingency table of quarterly performance.
Each quarter all funds are ranked in ten deciles, and this is compared with
their ranking in the previous quarter. The table also incorporates liquidated
funds and new funds that enter the database (after a backll period of four
quarters) and is therefore not a¤ected by look-ahead bias. Funds that are
in the top decile (decile 10) have a probability of about 20% of being a top
performer in the next quarter again. They have a probability of about 17%
of ending up in the loser decile (decile 1). The funds that performed worst
(decile 1) in the ranking period, have the highest probability of being a loser
again (about 24%), but also a probability of about 4% of being liquidated
in the next quarter. Moreover, these funds have a high probability of more
than 16% to end up in the winner decile. The most likely explanation for this
nding is that funds in the extreme deciles (deciles 1 and 10) are more risky
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than those in the other deciles. More risk is associated with higher average
returns, but also with bigger chances of extremely good and extremely poor
outcomes. Such funds are more likely to move from the winner to the loser
decile or vice versa. In line with this, we observe that funds from the middle
deciles are more likely to remain in the middle deciles than to move to one of
the extreme deciles. The probability of being liquidated in the next quarter
is relatively high for the lower deciles.
The previous analysis does not provide information about the levels of
average returns across the di¤erent deciles. To investigate this, we rank the
funds in the so-called ranking period on the basis of past average returns
over the previous quarter, the previous year or the previous two years. This
ranking is broken down into ten deciles. To avoid double counting, fund-of-
funds are excluded from this exercise. In the subsequent evaluation period we
calculate the average returns for each of these deciles. For instance, for the
one year ranking period this implies that the rst ranking is based on returns
over the year 1994 (i.e. the rst year of our sample), while the evaluation
period is the year 1995. The procedure is repeated over the entire sample
period, moving forward by one quarter at the time and adjusting the sample
to include those funds that have a su¢ ciently long return history. As a result
these rankings are conditional upon survival over the ranking and evaluation
periods. Multi-period selection bias or look-ahead bias may thus distort the
empirical results. As before, we take account of potential backll biases by










Contingency table of initial and subsequent
 performance rankings
Ranking criterion : past one-quarter raw returns
Best
Best
Hedge funds are sorted each quarter from 1994Q1 to 2000Q1 into ten rank portfolios based on their
previous one-quarter net raw returns, provided they have a return history of at least 4 quarters.  This
initial ranking is compared to the fund's subsequent one-quarter return ranking. The bar in cell (i,j)
represents the conditional probability of achieving a subsequent ranking of decile j  given an initial
ranking of decile i . New funds are placed in a separate category. In this case bar in cell (i,j)
represents the conditional probability of achieving a ranking of decile j in the quarter subsequent to the
starting-operations quarter.
Figure 3: Contingency table of quarterly performance
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As is well known by now, spurious performance persistence patterns might
arise that are due to look-ahead bias (Carpenter and Lynch, 1999). Follow-
ing the correction procedure introduced by ter Horst, Nijman and Verbeek
(2001), we also present persistence results that are corrected for look-ahead
bias. Basically, the correction method implies a multiplication of the per-
formance measure (e.g. the average return over the ranking period) with a
weight factor, which is the ratio of an unconditional non-liquidation proba-
bility in the numerator and a conditional non-liquidation probability in the
denominator. The latter one can be obtained from the estimated liquidation
process that is reported in Section 3, while the unconditional probability can
be estimated by the ratio of the funds that were not liquidated during the
ranking period and the number of funds present in the sample at the begin-
ning of the ranking period. The correction for the average returns over the
evaluation period is similar, except that the unconditional probabilities are
conditional upon the funds decile during the ranking period (but not upon
the entire return history).8
Consider the case that we are interested in persistence in raw returns at
an annual horizon. This implies that we can only use information on funds
that have reported returns for at least four consecutive quarters. Let Yit = 1
if fund i has survived during quarters t to t + 3 (and Yit = 0 otherwise)
and let Ri denote the entire vector of fund returns. The probability that a
fund is observed in quarters t to t + 3; after a backll period of 4 quarters,
8The correction assumes that self-selection is determined exogenously.
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and given its returns and given its characteristics Xit (age, management
fees, investment style, net asset value), can be obtained from the liquidation
model. Assuming that liquidation is independent of current or future returns,
this probability is
PfYit = 1jRi; Xitg =
s+3Q
t=s
Pfyit = 1jri;t 1;:::;xi;t 1g: (2)
Estimates for the probabilities at the right-hand side are directly obtained
from the probit model. The unconditional non-liquidation probability can
easily be estimated by the ratio of the appropriate number of funds that
did not liquidate between quarter t and t+ 3 and the number of funds that
was in the sample in quarter t   1: As shown by ter Horst, Nijman and
Verbeek (2001), multiplying the returns for funds used in the analysis by the
resulting weight factors provides the unconditional distribution of returns we
are interested in.
In Table 7 we report empirical persistence of raw returns at quarterly
and annual horizons, with and without correcting for look-ahead bias. The
results for the annual horizon are also represented graphically in Figure 4.
All estimates are based on the full sample of hedge funds, excluding fund-of-
funds. The results in Table 7 show some interesting patterns. At the annual
level, we see that the persistence pattern without corrections is slightly J-
shaped. Given the results of Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1997), Brown,
Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross (1997), and ter Horst, Nijman and Verbeek
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(2001), a pattern like this may be attributable to look-ahead bias. Correct-
ing for look-ahead bias attens the J-shaped pattern. Without corrections,
average returns may be overestimated by as much as 3:8% (decile 1), which is
statistically signicant with a t-value of 2.59. This shows that the impact of
look-ahead bias upon persistence measures may be quite severe. In contrast,
ter Horst, Nijman and Verbeek (2001), studying persistence in performance
of growthand incomemutual funds, report only slightly di¤erent estimates
after correcting for look-ahead bias. These ndings show that the impact of
look-ahead bias in persistence estimates is much larger for hedge funds than
it is for mutual funds. The most likely explanation for this is the stronger
relationship between hedge fund survival and historical performance. The
corrections for look-ahead bias are most pronounced for the extreme deciles,
which is to be expected given that these deciles typically contain the more
risky funds. The nding that look-ahead bias has a U -shaped pattern is due
to the cross-sectional dispersion in fund specic risk. Funds ranked in one
of the extreme deciles are more likely to be high riskfunds and thus less
likely to survive. Conditional upon the fact that they have not been liqui-
dated during the evaluation period, they will have made better returns than
average; see ter Horst, Nijman and Verbeek (2001) for additional discussion.
At the quarterly horizon, we clearly observe positive persistence in hedge
fund returns, particularly for the best four deciles. For example, the top
decile provides an average return over the next quarter of 20:4% (annualized)
while the bottom decile provides only about 8:3%. This corresponds to the
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Table 7: Persistence Estimates (Raw returns)
Average performance (raw returns)
One-Quarter Four-Quarters
Decile non corrected corrected non corrected corrected
1 (losers) 0.092 0.083 0.159 0.121
(0.076) (0.077) (0.097) (0.099)
2 0.116 0.117 0.164 0.143
(0.048) (0.047) (0.064) (0.056)
3 0.124 0.124 0.146 0.131
(0.034) (0.033) (0.048) (0.045)
4 0.118 0.115 0.142 0.131
(0.030) (0.029) (0.041) (0.037)
5 0.121 0.124 0.141 0.143
(0.021) (0.021) (0.027) (0.029)
6 0.131 0.126 0.134 0.131
(0.024) (0.024) (0.034) (0.035)
7 0.143 0.140 0.139 0.135
(0.025) (0.025) (0.041) (0.042)
8 0.165 0.168 0.159 0.159
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035)
9 0.196 0.196 0.192 0.191
(0.045) (0.045) (0.051) (0.050)
10 (winners) 0.206 0.204 0.208 0.202
(0.067) (0.066) (0.109) (0.110)
winners - losers 0.115 0.120 0.049 0.082
(0.076) (0.079) (0.074) (0.080)
Each quarter, funds are sorted into ten rank portfolios based on their previ-
ous one-quarter or four-quarter returns, respectively. Next, average returns
over the next one or four quarters are computed, for each decile. Using
returns from 1994-2000, this produces a time-series for each decile of 22
average one-quarter returns, and 16 (overlapping) average four-quarter re-
turns. The numbers in the table are the annualized time-series averages and
their standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are corrected for
autocorrelation based on the Newey-West approach. The corrected gures
employ a weighting procedure to eliminate look-ahead bias.
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Table 8: Persistence Estimates (Raw returns), continued
Average performance (raw returns)
Eight-Quarter
Decile non corrected corrected corrected
(robust estimates)
1 (losers) 0.039 -0.021 0.020
(0.041) (0.046) (0.024)
2 0.076 0.050 0.044
(0.096) (0.093) (0.059)
3 0.116 0.112 0.102
(0.059) (0.063) (0.045)
4 0.110 0.106 0.105
(0.021) (0.029) (0.030)
5 0.121 0.116 0.113
(0.033) (0.038) (0.040)
6 0.131 0.115 0.115
(0.042) (0.043) (0.044)
7 0.159 0.160 0.145
(0.057) (0.052) (0.041)
8 0.174 0.162 0.153
(0.068) (0.052) (0.033)
9 0.152 0.155 0.156
(0.047) (0.055) (0.049)
10 (winners) 0.082 0.050 0.064
(0.082) (0.100) (0.082)
winners - losers 0.044 0.070 0.044
(0.095 ) (0.104) (0.079)
Each quarter, funds are sorted into ten rank portfolios based on their pre-
vious eight-quarter returns. Next, average returns over the next eight quar-
ters are computed, for each decile. Using returns from 1994-2000, this pro-
duces a time-series for each decile of 8 (overlapping) average eight-quarter
returns. The numbers in the table are the annualized time-series average
returns and their standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are
corrected for autocorrelation based on the Newey-West approach. The cor-
rected gures employ a weighting procedure to eliminate look-ahead bias.
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Figure 4: Annual persistence in raw returns.
ndings of Agarwal and Naik (2000), who also nd strong persistence at a
quarterly horizon over the period 1982 - 1998. However, in their study the
issue of look-ahead bias is not taken into account. The corrections for look-
ahead bias reduce most of the averages somewhat, although the bias is much
less than in case of an annual horizon. Because these estimates refer to only
one quarter, it is not surprising that the look-ahead bias is less severe.
The results for a two-year horizon are reported in Table 8. Compared
to Table 7, the number of funds that can be used to estimate persistence is
substantially reduced. Both the corrected and uncorrected persistence esti-
mates show an increasing pattern over the deciles, with the exception of the
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top decile. Nevertheless, the winners outperform the losers by a statistically
insignicant 7%. To investigate the impact of the extreme observations, we
also computed average returns in the evaluation period giving zero weight to
the 1% lowest and 1% highest returns. This is expected to result in more
robust estimates for the expected returns during the evaluation period. The
results are reported in the last column of Table 8 and reduce the performance
of the winner-loser portfolio to 4:4%:
One explanation for positive persistence in raw returns, after correcting
for look-ahead bias, is the presence of cross-sectional variation in expected
fund returns due to heterogeneous style or (systematic) risk characteristics.
As argued by Boyson (2003), controlling for style is important in an analysis
of performance persistence among hedge funds. Therefore, we also examine
persistence in risk-adjusted returns. For hedge funds this is somewhat more
complicated than for mutual funds. Hedge fund returns typically have low
correlations with returns on standard asset pricing factors like the return on
the market portfolio. This is an important feature of hedge funds and makes
them an interesting investment vehicle for diversication opportunities. The
reason for the low correlation is that hedge funds often follow highly dynamic
investment styles, and are allowed to invest in derivatives, to take short
positions or to make use of leverage. The question how to obtain risk-adjusted
returns of hedge funds receives a lot of attention in the current literature.
Basically, two approaches can be found, the rst approach makes use of
indices that have option like pay-o¤ structures (see, e.g. Fung and Hsieh,
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1997, 2001, and Agarwal and Naik, 2004), while the second approach uses
peer group hedge fund indices (see, e.g. Lhabitant, 2001). The idea behind
the rst approach is that hedge fund strategies generate option-like returns
that should be reected in the benchmark indices. The second approach
avoids the problem and simply makes use of indices constructed out of other
hedge funds with the same reported style as the funds under consideration.
The rst approach is only suitable for very specic trading strategies, while
the second approach is much more general. However, it is more appropriate
to denote the obtained returns from the second approach as style-adjusted
or relative returns instead of risk-adjusted returns. Given that in our study
the focus is on persistence in hedge fund returns in general, and not for
a specic investment style, we decided to follow the second approach, and
examine whether hedge funds show persistence in style-adjusted or relative
returns. The style benchmarks we employ are the Tremont hedge fund style
indices, and correspond to the investment styles of the hedge funds in our
sample (see Table 3). Basically, we subtract from the raw return of a hedge
fund the return on the style benchmark the fund belongs to. Similarly to
the procedure followed in case of raw returns, we examine whether there is
persistence in relative returns.
In Table 9 we report persistence of relative returns at quarterly and an-
nual horizons, with and without corrections for look-ahead bias, while Figure
5 presents a visual representation of the results at the annual frequency. The
results for the biannual horizon are reported in Table 10. At the annual hori-
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Table 9: Persistence Estimates (Style-adjusted returns)
Average performance (style-adjusted returns)
One-Quarter Four-Quarter
Decile non corrected corrected non corrected corrected
1 (losers) -0.029 -0.033 -0.007 -0.036
(0.042) (0.043) (0.069) (0.063)
2 -0.021 -0.018 -0.019 -0.028
(0.022) (0.022) (0.043) (0.042)
3 -0.034 -0.036 -0.010 -0.010
(0.015) (0.016) (0.029) (0.029)
4 -0.022 -0.020 0.014 -0.018
(0.011) (0.011) (0.022) (0.021)
5 -0.001 -0.003 -0.015 -0.020
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016)
6 -0.002 -0.002 -0.010 -0.012
(0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011)
7 0.020 0.020 -0.006 -0.007
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
8 0.038 0.040 0.016 0.010
(0.021) (0.021) (0.013) (0.014)
9 0.052 0.047 0.018 0.014
(0.025) (0.025) (0.016) (0.014)
10 (winners) 0.065 0.067 0.066 0.062
(0.037) (0.037) (0.053) (0.054)
winners - losers 0.094 0.100 0.073 0.099
(0.066) (0.068) (0.090) (0.083)
Each quarter, funds are sorted into ten rank portfolios based on their previ-
ous one-quarter or four-quarter style-adjusted returns, respectively, where
style-adjusted returns are raw returns in deviation of the returns on an
appropriate style index. Next, average style-adjusted returns over the next
one or four quarters are computed, for each decile. Using returns from 1994-
2000, this produces a time-series for each decile of 22 average one-quarter
returns, and 16 (overlapping) average four-quarter returns. The numbers in
the table are the annualized time-series averages and their standard errors
in parentheses. The standard errors are corrected for autocorrelation based
on the Newey-West approach. The corrected gures employ a weighting
procedure to eliminate look-ahead bias.
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Table 10: Persistence Estimates (style-adjusted returns), continued
Average Performance (style-adjusted returns)
Eight-Quarter
Decile non corrected corrected corrected
(robust estimates)
1 (losers) -0.039 -0.116 -0.050
(0.099) (0.095) (0.068)
2 0.008 0.004 -0.013
(0.064) (0.062) (0.040)
3 0.001 -0.007 -0.014
(0.050) (0.048) (0.040)
4 -0.004 -0.009 -0.007
(0.034) (0.028) (0.026)
5 -0.009 -0.015 -0.012
(0.042) (0.041) (0.038)
6 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016
(0.032) (0.027) (0.027)
7 0.005 -0.002 -0.004
(0.051) (0.050) (0.025)
8 0.025 0.025 0.017
(0.037) (0.038) (0.019)
9 0.017 0.005 0.002
(0.030) (0.041) (0.036)
10 (winners) -0.027 -0.047 -0.053
(0.040) (0.052) (0.036)
winners - losers 0.012 0.069 -0.003
(0.136) (0.139) (0.102)
Each quarter, funds are sorted into ten rank portfolios based on their pre-
vious eight-quarter returns. Next, average returns over the next eight quar-
ters are computed, for each decile. Using returns from 1994-2000, this pro-
duces a time-series for each decile of 8 (overlapping) average eight-quarter
returns. The numbers in the table are the annualized time-series averages
and their standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are corrected
for autocorrelation based on the Newey-West approach. The corrected g-
ures employ a weighting procedure to eliminate look-ahead bias. The robust
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Figure 5: Annual persistence of style adjusted, relative returns.
zon we nd that the top three deciles (decile 8, 9 and 10) outperform their
style benchmark. The outperformance, although statistically insignicant,
increases from about 1% (decile 8) to somewhat more than 6% for decile 10
at an annual basis (corrected relative returns). For the remaining deciles
we nd underperformance and insignicant persistence of negative relative
returns. The e¤ect of look-ahead bias is most severe for decile 1, where the
bias is about 3%. At a quarterly horizon the persistence of relative returns
is stronger. For decile 7 this outperformance is about 2% and increases to
about 6:7% for decile 10. Similarly to the results of the raw returns, the e¤ect
of look-ahead bias is much smaller at a quarterly horizon than at an annual
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horizon. At a biannual horizon, reported in Table 10, we do not observe any
persistence of relative returns. Almost all funds show, on average, underper-
formance with respect to their corresponding style benchmark. When the
1% highest and lowest observations are omitted from the evaluation period,
we nd qualitatively similar results.
A major explanation for the fact that we observe more persistence in
hedge fund returns than is usually found for mutual fund returns, is that
liquidity in the hedge fund industry is severely restricted. While Berk and
Green (2004) argue that past performance is unable to predict future returns
of mutual funds due to the fact that mutual fund investors chase performance
by investing more in funds that recently performed well (see, e.g. Chevalier
and Ellison, 1997, Sirri and Tufano, 1998), hedge funds are characterized
by lockup periods and redemption notice periods. Moreover, regulatory re-
strictions may limit the growth of (on-shore) hedge funds. When investment
strategies employed by hedge fund managers cannot be scaled up without
limit, performance fees and high-water mark contracts provide incentives to
the manager to close the fund for new investors or otherwise limit the in-
ow of new money (see Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross, 2001). However,
the persistence found above may not be exploitable if the funds in the top
deciles are closed for new investments. To address this issue9, we analyze the
subsequent performance of the top three deciles, while concentrating only on
those funds that are actually taking new money. While our database pro-
9We are grateful to the referee for this suggestion.
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Table 11: Persistence Estimates of the top three deciles (raw re-
turns)
Average raw returns of the three top deciles
One-Quarter Four-Quarter
Decile all funds open funds all funds open funds
8 0.168 0.177 0.159 0.154
(0.034) (0.036) (0.035) (0.038)
9 0.196 0.219 0.191 0.190
(0.045) (0.050) (0.050) (0.049)
10 (winners) 0.204 0.218 0.202 0.217
(0.066) (0.073) (0.110) (0.116)
winners - losers 0.120 0.135 0.082 0.096
(0.079) (0.083) (0.080) (0.079)
Each quarter, funds are sorted into ten rank portfolios based on their pre-
vious one-quarter or four-quarter raw returns, respectively. Next, average
raw returns over the next one or four quarters are computed, for each decile.
Using returns from 1994-2000, this produces a time-series for each decile of
22 average one-quarter returns, and 16 (overlapping) average four-quarter
returns. The numbers in the table are the annualized time-series averages
and their standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are corrected
for autocorrelation based on the Newey-West approach. The columns la-
belled open fundsare based on average returns across the subset of funds
in that decile that are classied as open for investment. The gures employ
a weighting procedure to eliminate look-ahead bias.
vides information about whether or not a fund is closed for investment, this
applies only at the time the data were purchased. To solve this problem,
we use money ows during the evaluation period to classify funds as closed
or open for investment. In particular, we dene funds as being closed for
investmentif average cash ows during the four quarters before the end of
the evaluation period are less than 1%10.
Table 11 presents the estimated average returns for the top three deciles
when we exclude funds that are classied as closed for investment and con-
10Experimenting with alternative cut o¤ rates led to very similar results.
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strasts them with the corresponding gures based on the entire sample of
funds. In case of decile 10, the average return increases from 20.4% to 22.2%
at a quarterly horizon, while in case of an annual horizon, the average re-
turn increases from 20.2% to 21.7% (corrected returns). From this table we
conclude that the persistence results are robust for excluding funds that are
classied as closed for new investments. Apparently, the persistence is not
driven by well performing funds that are closed for new money, suggesting
that it might be exploitable for investors.
5 Concluding remarks
Empirical studies analyzing the performance of hedge funds are hampered
by high attrition rates, due to fund liquidation and the possibility that funds
stop reporting to the database vendor. The results in this paper clearly in-
dicate that fund liquidation is driven by historical returns, attrition rates
being higher for funds that perform poorly. Given endogenous liquidation,
standard ways of analyzing persistence in performance are a¤ected by look-
ahead bias, as one is implicitly conditioning upon the fund having observed
returns for a number of consecutive quarters. To eliminate such biases, it is
possible to use a weighting procedure, which requires an appropriate model
that relates fund survival to fund performance and other observables.
The empirical model for hedge fund liquidation estimated in this paper
indicates that historical performance is an important factor explaining fund
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liquidation, where performance in the more distant past is of smaller im-
portance. Moreover, if the aggregated return over a previous predetermined
period is negative, implying that it is unlikely for the manager to receive
the incentive fee, a hedge fund has a much higher probability to liquidate.
Other signicant factors explaining survival are fund age, net asset value, in-
vestment style and the magnitude of the incentive fee. The impact of age is
nonlinear, with lower attrition rates for young and mature funds. Using the
empirical liquidation model, we determined the persistence in fund returns
with and without correcting for look-ahead bias, using a simple weighting
procedure. The results indicate that look-ahead bias is quite severe. While
ter Horst, Nijman and Verbeek (2001) nd that look-ahead bias is of minor
importance for mutual funds, this paper nds that it can be quite impor-
tant for hedge funds, whose attrition rates are higher. For example, without
correcting for look-ahead bias, expected future returns of poorly performing
funds may be overestimated by as much as 3:8% per year, a number which
is statistically signicant and higher than the typical 2% per year that is
associated with survivorship bias. This stresses the importance in empiri-
cal studies of correcting for look-ahead bias in addition to survivorship bias.
The nding that the greater total risk of hedge funds over their mutual fund
counterparts exacerbates look-ahead bias conrms the results in Brown et al.
(1992) who introduce the idea that look-ahead bias is a theoretical result of
the cross-sectional dispersion of volatility across funds.
For the one quarter horizon, the corrected results indicate a clear pattern
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of positive persistence in raw fund returns. That is, the best 20 to 30% of
the funds are expected to provide above average returns in the subsequent
evaluation period too. For the annual horizon, the pattern is also consistent
with positive persistence, but statistically insignicant. In order to check
whether the presence of cross-sectional variation in expected returns due to
style or risk characteristics explains the observed persistence patterns in raw
returns, we also examined persistence in style-adjusted returns. By subtract-
ing from the raw hedge fund returns the return of the corresponding style
benchmark, and following the same procedure as in case of raw returns, we
determined the persistence in relative returns with and without correcting
for look-ahead bias. At a quarterly and annual horizon the graphs show that,
on average, the top deciles outperform their style benchmark. For the top
10% of the hedge funds this outperformance is around a statistically insigni-
cant 6% for an annual horizon, and around 6:7% (annualized) for a quarterly
horizon. At a biannual horizon we mainly found underperformance of the
hedge funds with respect to their style benchmark. Interestingly, persistence
in hedge fund performance seems to be located in both the top and bottom
parts of the distribution. That is, poorly performing funds tend to under-
perform during the next 12 months, while the best performing funds tend to
outperform.
The average excess returns on a winner-loser strategy at the annual hori-
zon during the period 1994-2000 are 8.2% and 9.9%, based on raw and style-
adjusted returns, respectively. Despite the lack of statistical signicance,
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these numbers are potentially economically important. A major explanation
for the fact that we observe more persistence in hedge fund returns than is
usually found for mutual fund returns, is that liquidity in the hedge fund in-
dustry is severely restricted. While Berk and Green (2004), argue that much
of the persistence in mutual fund returns is competed away by mutual fund
investors rationally shifting their capital in search of superior investments,
hedge funds are characterized by lockup periods and redemption notice peri-
ods. Regulatory restrictions may limit the growth of (on-shore) hedge funds.
Further, when investment strategies employed by hedge fund managers can-
not be scaled up without limit, performance fees and high-water mark con-
tracts provide incentives to the manager to close the fund for new investors
or otherwise limit the inow of new money (see Goetzmann, Ingersoll and
Ross, 2001). A robustness check, where we consider funds with very low or
negative cash ows as closed for investment, shows very similar returns for
the top three deciles. This suggests that the persistence results are robust,
and that they might be exploitable for investors.
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